CSC 244/444
Assignment 1 Solutions

1. Human Knowledge and Reasoning
(No ‘gold standard’ answer for these.)

2. Logical Syntax

(i) No: this is not well-formed. The BNF production with ‘=’ requires
two terms on each side, but $P(A)$ is a formula, not a term.

(ii) No: this is not well-formed. The BNF production with ‘=’ requires
two terms on each side, but $(P(A) \land P(A))$ is a formula, not a term.

(iii) No: this is not well-formed. A predicate can only have terms as
arguments, but $Hillary \land Bill$ is not a term ($Hillary \land Bill$ itself is
not well-formed either, since binary connectives require two formulas
on each side, and a formula cannot consist of a single term.

(iv) Yes: this is well-formed.

(v) Yes: this is well-formed. Although it seems weird to us, nothing
about the BNF grammar says that nested quantifiers cannot use the
same variable, syntactically speaking.

(vi) No: this is not well-formed. The function ‘f’ does not have consistent
arity, as both $f(A)$ and $f(A, B)$ show up.

(vii) Yes: this is well-formed (although it’s not what we would typically
call a sentence, which is reserved for closed well-formed formulas).

(viii) No: this is not well-formed. As per the BNF grammar, one of the
nested formula expressions should be wrapped with outer parentheses
to avoid ambiguity.

3. From English to Logic

(a) (i)

$$\exists x. Ocean(x) \land Beneath(x, surface-of(Europa))$$

(ii)

$$\forall x. Planet(x) \Rightarrow \exists y. Star(y) \land Orbits(x, y)$$

(iii)

$$\forall x. Dromedary(x) \Rightarrow \exists y. Hump(y) \land Has-as-part(x, y) \land
\forall z. (Hump(z) \land Has-as-part(x, z)) \Rightarrow z = y$$
(iv) 
\[ \forall x. Elephant(x) \Rightarrow \exists t1, t2. Tusk(t1) \land Has-as-part(x, t1) \land Tusk(t2) \land Has-as-part(x, t2) \land \neg (t1 = t2) \land \forall z. (Tusk(z) \land Has-as-part(x, z)) \Rightarrow ((z = t1) \lor (z = t2)) \]

(v) 
\[ \forall g. Undir-Graph(g) \Rightarrow Strongly-Connected(g) \iff \forall u, v. (Vertex-of(u, g) \land Vertex-of(v, g) \land \neg (u = v)) \Rightarrow \exists e. Edge-of(e, g) \land Joins(e, u, v) \]

(vi) 
\[ \exists x, e. Person(x) \land Fly-to(x, Mars, e) \land After(e, Sept-27-19) \]

(vii) 
\[ \forall x. Person(x) \Rightarrow \forall y. Ancestor(x, y) \iff (Parent(x, y) \lor (\exists z. Parent(x, z) \land Ancestor(z, y))) \]

(viii) 
\[ \exists x. Person(x) \land \forall y, e. Politician(y) \Rightarrow Fool(y, x, e) \]
\[ \forall y, e. Politician(x) \Rightarrow \exists x. Person(y) \land Fool(y, x, e) \]

(b) a. The difficulty here is the quantifier ”few”, which does not have a well-defined FOL equivalent and cannot be written in terms of \( \exists \) and \( \forall \). Hence, we would require some sort of generalized quantifier to be able to fully capture the meaning of ”few” (If you discussed this in some way, you got full credit). To do justice to ”few”, one approach is to modify the syntax of FOL to use restricted quantification: \([\exists x : Dog(x)].Vicious(x)\). Here, the formula following the colon is a restriction on the quantifier, and is intended to restrict x to only range over those elements of the domain which are in the extension of Dog. A first stab at the semantics for this example, then, might be:

\[ \models_M[\exists x : Dog(x)].Vicious(x) \]
\[ \text{iff } \text{card}(Dog^I \cap Vicious^I) < \text{card}(Dog^I - Vicious^I) \]

That is, the cardinality of the set of individuals that are both Dog and Vicious is less than the cardinality of the set of individuals that are Dog and not Vicious. Note that this satisfaction condition is defined as a binary relation over the restrictor and the scope of the quantifier.
b. This can be done in standard FOL including a time-period as an argument to Visited (similar to (vi) in the previous section), and using 10 existentially quantified time-periods/events, including predicates that assert none of these time-periods are not self-identical to each other. However, such a formula would be rather ungainly. Ideally we would want to extend FOL using generalized quantifiers to allow quantification over cardinalities, e.g. \( \exists_{10} e. \text{Visit}(\text{Jack}, \text{India}, e) \).

c. Syntactically, representing this sentence in FOL seems to force us to nest a predicate inside a predicate (e.g. \( \text{Suspects}(\text{Mary}, \text{Loves}(\text{John}, \text{Mary})) \)), which is not well-formed. Semantically, ‘Suspects’ is really a modal operator, i.e. it may be the case that \( \neg \text{Loves}(\text{John}, \text{Mary}) \), yet simultaneously \( \models \text{Suspects}(\text{Mary}, \text{Loves}(\text{John}, \text{Mary})) \) (ignoring for a moment the syntax issue). This type of sentence has lead to a branch of modal logic which represents belief/suspicion through use of a modal operator, e.g. \( \mathcal{B}_{\text{Mary}} \text{Loves}(\text{John}, \text{Mary}) \), where the semantics of the modal operator are expressed in terms of ”possible worlds” and accessibility relations between them.

d. One might naively express this sentence as \( \forall x. \text{Red}(x) \land \text{Hair}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Copper-Colored}(x) \). However, this doesn’t seem to capture the meaning of the sentence: the above FOL says that anything which is in both the set of things that are red and the set of things that are hair is copper-colored, but the sentence appears to be talking about hair which does not actually belong to the set of things that are red (hence ”actually”). In this case, we would need to define an extension of FOL which allows predicate modifiers, where for instance the semantic interpretation of ”Red” maps the interpretation of ”Hair” (a set) to some other set (in this case a subset of the interpretation of ”Hair”).

e. A way of expressing this sentence might be \( \exists x, e. \text{Colloquium}(x) \land \text{Cancel}(x, e) \land \text{Before}(e, \text{Now}1) \). However, the issue with this is that some individual in the domain ought not to be in the set denoted by Colloquium if it was cancelled (that is, a cancelled colloquium is not in fact a colloquium). So we would need some sort of intensional modifier, true of mental/imaginary entities, to be able to talk about entities like ”the expected colloquium” for instance.

f. Expressing this as \( \forall x. \text{Mosquito}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Widespread}(x) \) would be incorrect, since it’s not the case that every individual mosquito is widespread. Rather, this sentence appears to be making a proposition about mosquitos as a collective class. One might address
this by extending FOL with a ”kind” operator, e.g. \textit{Widespread}(k : \textit{Mosquito}(x)), which takes a unary predicate such as \textit{Mosquito} (in this case with a free variable, although the syntax is ad hoc) and maps it to a single individual representing the abstract kind denoted by the predicate.

\textbf{g.} Similarly to the previous example, the issue here is the impossibility of making propositions about \textit{types of actions}, such as copying, in FOL. Ideally, we would want a ”kind” operator for actions which maps some binary predicate to an individual in the domain, perhaps similarly to the previous example: \textit{Forbidden}(ka : \textit{Copy}(x, y)). Again, the syntax here is ad-hoc.

\textbf{h.} The issue here is closely related to the issue in (f). In this case, the extension of Wookiee (the set denoted by Wookiee) is the empty set: a Wookiee is not an individual which actually exists in the real domain. Nonetheless, we need ways to represent \textit{intensional predicates} such as ”resembles”, which may for instance take a \textit{kind} of thing, or an \textit{idea} of a thing, as arguments as well as specific individuals (e.g. ”his father”).

\textbf{i.} The issue here is very similar to (e). We cannot use FOL to express that Jack \textit{nearly} had an accident, as that would require referring to an ”accident” individual which is in fact not a member of the interpretation of ”accident”, since it did not in fact take place.

\textbf{j.} ”Perhaps” here is another modal operator, as in (c). Traditionally, possibility is represented in modal logic as \textit{\Diamond p}, i.e. ”it is possible that \textit{p}”, and again relies on possible world semantics.